[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"repo-stars":3,"vuln-DEBIAN-CVE-2024-39486":6},{"stargazers_count":4,"fetched_at":5},7,"2026-06-04T14:53:31.930Z",{"id":7,"descriptions":8,"cisa":9,"weaknesses":10,"exploits":11,"aliases":12,"duplicate_of":9,"upstream":13,"downstream":16,"duplicates":17,"related":18,"reserved_at":9,"published_at":19,"modified_at":20,"state":9,"summary":21,"references_raw":23,"kevs":30,"epss":9,"epss_history":31,"metrics":32,"affected":38},"DEBIAN-CVE-2024-39486","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  drm/drm_file: Fix pid refcounting race  \u003Cmaarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>, Maxime Ripard \u003Cmripard@kernel.org>, Thomas Zimmermann \u003Ctzimmermann@suse.de>  filp->pid is supposed to be a refcounted pointer; however, before this patch, drm_file_update_pid() only increments the refcount of a struct pid after storing a pointer to it in filp->pid and dropping the dev->filelist_mutex, making the following race possible:  process A               process B =========               =========                         begin drm_file_update_pid                         mutex_lock(&dev->filelist_mutex)                         rcu_replace_pointer(filp->pid, \u003Cpid B>, 1)                         mutex_unlock(&dev->filelist_mutex) begin drm_file_update_pid mutex_lock(&dev->filelist_mutex) rcu_replace_pointer(filp->pid, \u003Cpid A>, 1) mutex_unlock(&dev->filelist_mutex) get_pid(\u003Cpid A>) synchronize_rcu() put_pid(\u003Cpid B>)   *** pid B reaches refcount 0 and is freed here ***                         get_pid(\u003Cpid B>)   *** UAF ***                         synchronize_rcu()                         put_pid(\u003Cpid A>)  As far as I know, this race can only occur with CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU=y because it requires RCU to detect a quiescent state in code that is not explicitly calling into the scheduler.  This race leads to use-after-free of a \"struct pid\". It is probably somewhat hard to hit because process A has to pass through a synchronize_rcu() operation while process B is between mutex_unlock() and get_pid().  Fix it by ensuring that by the time a pointer to the current task's pid is stored in the file, an extra reference to the pid has been taken.  This fix also removes the condition for synchronize_rcu(); I think that optimization is unnecessary complexity, since in that case we would usually have bailed out on the lockless check above.",null,[],[],[],[14],{"_key":15},"CVE-2024-39486",[],[],[],"2024-07-06T10:15:03.393Z","2026-04-28T20:28:13.964342Z",{"cisa_kev":22,"cisa_ransomware":22,"cisa_vendor":9,"epss_severity":9,"epss_score":9,"severity":9,"severity_score":9,"severity_version":9,"severity_source":9,"severity_vector":9,"severity_status":9},false,[24],{"url":25,"sources":26,"tags":28},"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-39486",[27],"osv_debian",[29],"Advisory",[],[],[33],{"source":27,"cvss_v2_0":9,"cvss_v3_0":9,"cvss_v3_1":34,"cvss_v4_0":9},{"baseScore":4,"baseSeverity":9,"vectorString":35,"impactScore":36,"exploitabilityScore":37},"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",9.8,2.6,[39],{"ecosystem":40,"name":41,"vendor":42,"product":41,"cpe_part":9,"purl_type":43,"purl_namespace":42,"purl_name":41,"source":9,"versions":44},"Debian","linux","debian","deb",[45,51],{"version":46,"is_range":47,"range_type":48,"version_start":9,"version_start_type":9,"version_end":49,"version_end_type":50,"fixed_in":9},"lt6_9_8_1",true,"ecosystem","6.9.8-1","excluding",{"version":46,"is_range":47,"range_type":48,"version_start":9,"version_start_type":9,"version_end":49,"version_end_type":50,"fixed_in":9}]