[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"repo-stars":3,"vuln-DEBIAN-CVE-2026-63808":6},{"stargazers_count":4,"fetched_at":5},8,"2026-09-19T04:32:17.889Z",{"id":7,"descriptions":8,"cisa":9,"weaknesses":10,"exploits":11,"aliases":12,"duplicate_of":9,"upstream":13,"downstream":16,"duplicates":17,"related":18,"reserved_at":9,"published_at":19,"modified_at":20,"state":9,"summary":21,"references_raw":23,"kevs":30,"epss":9,"epss_history":31,"metrics":32,"affected":38},"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-63808","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry()  In exfat_find_dir_entry(), the buffer_head obtained from exfat_get_dentry() is released with brelse(bh) before the fall-through TYPE_EXTEND branch reads the directory entry through ep (which points into bh->b_data):  \tbrelse(bh); \tif (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) { \t\t... \t\tlen = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname); \t\t... \t}  After brelse() drops our reference, nothing guarantees that the underlying page backing bh->b_data remains valid for the subsequent exfat_extract_uni_name() read. This is the same pattern fixed in commit fc961522ddbd (\"exfat: Fix potential use after free in exfat_load_upcase_table()\").  Move brelse(bh) so it runs after ep is no longer dereferenced on each branch.  Confirmed on QEMU x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN=y + CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y + CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y on linux-next, using a crafted exFAT image (long filename with same-hash collisions forcing the TYPE_EXTEND path). With a debug-only invalidate_bdev() inserted between brelse(bh) and the ep read to make the stale-deref window deterministic, the unpatched kernel faults:    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry+0x133b/0x15a0   BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88801a5fa0c2   Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI   RIP: 0010:exfat_find_dir_entry+0x1188/0x15a0  With this patch applied, the same instrumented harness completes cleanly under the same sanitizer stack. I have not reproduced a crash on an uninstrumented kernel under ordinary reclaim; the instrumented A/B establishes the lifetime violation and that the patch closes it, not an unaided triggerability claim.",null,[],[],[],[14],{"_key":15},"CVE-2026-63808",[],[],[],"2026-07-19T12:16:53.620Z","2026-07-21T09:00:38.216819987Z",{"cisa_kev":22,"cisa_ransomware":22,"cisa_vendor":9,"epss_severity":9,"epss_score":9,"severity":9,"severity_score":9,"severity_version":9,"severity_source":9,"severity_vector":9,"severity_status":9},false,[24],{"url":25,"sources":26,"tags":28},"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-63808",[27],"osv_debian",[29],"Advisory",[],[],[33],{"source":27,"cvss_v2_0":9,"cvss_v3_0":9,"cvss_v3_1":34,"cvss_v4_0":9},{"baseScore":35,"baseSeverity":9,"vectorString":36,"impactScore":35,"exploitabilityScore":37},9.8,"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",10,[39],{"ecosystem":40,"name":41,"vendor":42,"product":41,"cpe_part":9,"purl_type":43,"purl_namespace":42,"purl_name":41,"source":9,"versions":44},"Debian","linux","debian","deb",[45,49,53,56],{"version":46,"is_range":47,"range_type":48,"version_start":9,"version_start_type":9,"version_end":9,"version_end_type":9,"fixed_in":9},"all",true,"ecosystem",{"version":50,"is_range":47,"range_type":48,"version_start":9,"version_start_type":9,"version_end":51,"version_end_type":52,"fixed_in":9},"lt6_1_177_1","6.1.177-1","excluding",{"version":54,"is_range":47,"range_type":48,"version_start":9,"version_start_type":9,"version_end":55,"version_end_type":52,"fixed_in":9},"lt6_12_95_1","6.12.95-1",{"version":57,"is_range":47,"range_type":48,"version_start":9,"version_start_type":9,"version_end":58,"version_end_type":52,"fixed_in":9},"lt7_1_3_1","7.1.3-1"]