Cisco Meraki Mr76 vulnerabilities

5 vulnerabilities

Known vulnerabilities in Cisco Meraki Mr76, newest first, with CVSS severity, EPSS, KEV listings, ransomware use and the affected versions.

6.5CVE-2020-26141alfaawus036h_firmware+147
EPSS score
3.07%
An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The Wi-Fi implementation does not verify the Message Integrity Check (authenticity) of fragmented TKIP frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject and possibly decrypt packets in WPA or WPA2 networks that support the TKIP data-confidentiality protocol.5.3CVE-2020-26139aristac-100_firmware+220
EPSS score
6.49%
An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.6.5CVE-2020-26140alfaawus036h_firmware+363
EPSS score
2.92%
An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.2.6CVE-2020-24587aristac-100_firmware+222
EPSS score
2.59%
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.3.5CVE-2020-24588aristac-100_firmware+235
EPSS score
3.61%
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.