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Remove nowMAL-2026-20306Npm · xssdoctor-muse-task448-provider-runtimeNpm xssdoctor-muse-task448-provider-runtimeMalicious code in xssdoctor-muse-task448-provider-runtime (npm) --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4230304085532b4b5492793f98624638942a036313cbb309b61478efc6f54953) The package exports runProviderHealth(), which reads a file at a path relative to the package install location (../../../canary/.task318-private-canary), base64url-encodes the contents, and sends them as a query parameter to the hardcoded endpoint https://poc.xssdoctor.com/task328/collect. The package name uses a scoped-looking identifier consistent with a dependency-confusion lure: if an internal build resolves this public name in place of a private one and loads the module, any file contents present at that relative path are transmitted to the author-controlled host. The read reaches outside the package's own directory, the destination is hardcoded and not caller-configurable, and the data flow produces author benefit regardless of the self-described bug-bounty framing of the endpoint.CVSSUnscoredMaliciousRemove nowMAL-2026-20305Npm · vreqtx-b5w3n-testmetestNpm vreqtx-b5w3n-testmetestMalicious code in vreqtx-b5w3n-testmetest (npm) --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fd8b0671f1c77b8c7d843dce49845750fd043f50f20c92a4677d1c117b98c00c) On require(), index.js loads a platform-specific native N-API addon (native.napi.node / native_win.node). The addon reads a 1.19 MB sibling file `.napi_cache` at the package root — a file with no printable strings consistent with encrypted/packed executable content — writes derived bytes to a hidden temp path, and spawns them as a detached process: on Linux via fork/setsid/execlp staging to `/tmp/.<uid>` with chmod and an `__IS_DAEMON` marker, and on Windows via CreateProcessA invoking `node "%TEMP%\...nc<pid>.js"` using GetTempPathA. The dropper is gated by extensive anti-analysis evasion: enumeration of CI env vars (GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, TRAVIS, CIRCLECI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, CODEBUILD_BUILD_ID, APPVEYOR, SEMAPHORE, TEAMCITY_VERSION, BITBUCKET_BUILD_NUMBER, NETLIFY, VERCEL, CF_BUILD_ID, SCREWDRIVER, SANDBOX), container markers (`/proc/1/cgroup` for docker/containerd/kubepod/podman, `/proc/1/cmdline` dockerinit), ptrace detection (`/proc/self/status` TracerPid, `/proc/self/maps`), and Windows debugger/analysis tool checks (IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, Process32First, wireshark, x64dbg, procmon). Package metadata is disposable (name `vreqtx-b5w3n-testmetest`, description `"test"`, no repository/author/homepage), consistent with a staging artifact. The `.napi_cache` naming disguises the primary executable payload as a build cache; the entire JS-visible surface is a thin loader for the opaque blob.CVSSUnscoredMaliciousRemove nowMAL-2026-20304Npm · qzi2v-tttf1-testmetestNpm qzi2v-tttf1-testmetestMalicious code in qzi2v-tttf1-testmetest (npm) --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b99ca6a65bd9e71ec0333a05a272ad0b11773ca20630f9d02ad79345a64b8fdc) The package presents itself as a utility library but exports nothing (index.js is 188 bytes and only require()s a platform-specific native addon). Three precompiled native binaries are shipped (native_win.node, native_mac.node, native.napi.node) alongside a 1,192,296-byte opaque `.napi_cache` blob with zero printable strings and no native source. Strings in the binaries show the addon reads `.napi_cache`, writes a staged JS file matching `%s.nc%lu.js` (Linux/mac also `/tmp/.%u`), and executes it via `node "%s"` using `CreateProcessA` on Windows and `fork`/`execlp` on Linux/mac. The loader is gated on CI environment variables (GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, CIRCLECI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, CODEBUILD) and includes anti-analysis checks (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, process enumeration via Process32First, strings referencing `wireshark` and `httpdebug`, container/daemon detection via `/proc/1/cgroup` and `dockerinit`, `setsid` + `__IS_DAEMON`). Any `require()` of this package on a matching CI host decrypts and executes attacker-controlled code from the shipped blob under the installer's build identity. The package metadata is a thin stub (random-looking name, no author, no repository, description `utility library`) consistent with a disposable build-system targeting dropper rather than a real library.CVSSUnscoredMaliciousRemove nowMAL-2026-20303Npm · identity-pocNpm identity-pocMalicious code in identity-poc (npm) --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fa4ad4604b2f07da32d5dd7355090d0941d2b03799c5ccd4e6040d2638b5b63c) On require() or CLI invocation, a top-level IIFE in the package's main entry unconditionally runs `id`, `whoami`, and `ls -la`, reads `/etc/passwd`, and POSTs the collected report to a URL supplied as `process.argv[2]`. The payload emits an `IDENTITY_POC_EXECUTED` marker and carries a generic 'Controlled execution verification' description, matching the shape of a dependency-confusion / bug-bounty collaborator proof-of-concept that proves code execution on an installer's host and exfiltrates host identity and local file contents to an attacker-chosen destination. Because the exfiltration fires at load time, any environment that installs and loads this package name — whether as an intended dependency or via dependency-confusion resolution against an internal package of the same name — executes shell reconnaissance and leaks host data off-box.CVSSUnscoredMaliciousRemove nowMAL-2026-20301Npm · lyxe-baileysNpm lyxe-baileysMalicious code in lyxe-baileys (npm) --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (29d5025bd68086bd309adb4b8f0da4afafcdbc12ed0d5821c8a0d437fe609658) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.CVSSUnscoredMaliciousInsufficient evidenceDLA-4923-1debian · sympadebian sympasympa - security updateCVSSUnscored