Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Keypont vulnerabilities
2 vulnerabilities
Known vulnerabilities in Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Keypont, newest first, with CVSS severity, EPSS, KEV listings, ransomware use and the affected versions.
RoutineCVE-2026-115409eclipse foundation · eclipse keypontUnverified key-pair binding lets an unauthenticated token user substitute the public key or certificate returned for a private keyIn `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2` versions `<= 2.0.0-rc8` (and the deprecated v1 module paths `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11 <= 1.6.8`, `github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11 <= 1.7.0-rc1` and `github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11 <= 1.2.5`), the key-pair and certificate lookup functions (`FindKeyPair`, `FindKeyPairs`, `FindKeyPairsWithAttributes`, `FindAllKeyPairs`, the `FindRSAKeyPair*` family and `FindAllPairedCertificates`) pair a private key with a public key object, or with a certificate, by `CKA_ID`/`CKA_LABEL` alone, take the first match the token returns, and never verify that it belongs to the private key. PKCS#11 permits a session that has not logged in to create public token objects, so anyone able to open a session on the token — without the PIN — can plant a public key or certificate carrying a victim key's `CKA_ID` and label, and crypto11 may return it as that key's public half. An application that publishes or trusts `Signer.Public()` (a JWKS endpoint, a key registry, `authorized_keys`, a CSR) then publishes the attacker's key, and relying parties accept anything the attacker signs as coming from the service. On the v1 line the lookup also falls back to a class-and-key-type-only search when the private key has no `CKA_ID`, pairing a label-only private key with the first public key of its type on the token.
The v1 module paths are deprecated and will not be fixed; users should migrate to github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2 version 2.0.0-rc9 or later.CVSS6.5MediumRoutineCVE-2026-115408eclipse foundation · eclipse keypontML-KEM key-pair lookup can bind an unrelated or attacker-planted public key, exposing encapsulated shared secretsIn `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2` versions `>= 2.0.0-rc3, <= 2.0.0-rc8`, the ML-KEM key-pair lookup functions (`FindMLKEMKeyPair`, `FindMLKEMKeyPairs`, `FindMLKEMKeyPairsWithAttributes`) locate the public half of an ML-KEM key pair by `CKA_ID`/`CKA_LABEL` and never verify it against the private key. In addition, the "ID only" fallback search runs even when the private key has no `CKA_ID`, so the search template reduces to the public-key class and the ML-KEM key type and the first ML-KEM public key on the token is returned. `Encapsulate()` on the resulting key pair encrypts the fresh shared secret to that key, so its owner — not the holder of the private key the caller looked up — can recover the secret. An attacker who can open an unauthenticated session on the token and plant a public `CKK_ML_KEM` object carrying the victim's `CKA_ID`/`CKA_LABEL` receives the shared secrets for encapsulations performed through the substituted key pair, compromising the confidentiality of those secrets and of everything protected by keys derived from them. The v1 module paths have no ML-KEM support and are not affected.CVSS5.5MediumEPSS0.08%