CveMateVulnerability intelligence

Python Software Foundation vulnerabilities

79 vulnerabilities

Known vulnerabilities in Python Software Foundation products, newest first, with CVSS severity, EPSS, KEV listings and ransomware use, across 4 products.

Products

4

Cpython75 vulnerabilities
Python2 vulnerabilities
Paramiko1 vulnerabilities
Pymanager1 vulnerabilities

CVE-2007-1657python_software_foundationpython19y ago24-03-2007 01:00

Stack-based buffer overflow in the file_compress function in minigzip (Modules/zlib) in Python 2.5 allows context-dependent attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long file argument.CVE-2025-13836chainguardpython-3.10+3110mo ago01-12-2025 18:02

When reading an HTTP response from a server, if no read amount is specified, the default behavior will be to use Content-Length. This allows a malicious server to cause the client to read large amounts of data into memory, potentially causing OOM or other DoS.CVE-2025-13837chainguardpython-3.10+2410mo ago01-12-2025 18:13

When loading a plist file, the plistlib module reads data in size specified by the file itself, meaning a malicious file can cause OOM and DoS issues CVE-2025-13462chainguardpython-3.10+277mo ago12-03-2026 17:59

The "tarfile" module would still apply normalization of AREGTYPE (\x00) blocks to DIRTYPE, even while processing a multi-block member such as GNUTYPE_LONGNAME or GNUTYPE_LONGLINK. This could result in a crafted tar archive being misinterpreted by the tarfile module compared to other implementations.CVE-2025-1795chainguardpython-3.10+311y ago28-02-2025 18:59

During an address list folding when a separating comma ends up on a folded line and that line is to be unicode-encoded then the separator itself is also unicode-encoded. Expected behavior is that the separating comma remains a plan comma. This can result in the address header being misinterpreted by some mail servers.CVE-2025-11468chainguardpython-3.10+259mo ago20-01-2026 21:09

When folding a long comment in an email header containing exclusively unfoldable characters, the parenthesis would not be preserved. This could be used for injecting headers into email messages where addresses are user-controlled and not sanitized.CVE-2025-0938alpinepython3+1081y ago31-01-2025 17:51

The Python standard library functions `urllib.parse.urlsplit` and `urlparse` accepted domain names that included square brackets which isn't valid according to RFC 3986. Square brackets are only meant to be used as delimiters for specifying IPv6 and IPvFuture hosts in URLs. This could result in differential parsing across the Python URL parser and other specification-compliant URL parsers.CVE-2025-4138alpinepython3+81y ago03-06-2025 12:59

Allows the extraction filter to be ignored, allowing symlink targets to point outside the destination directory, and the modification of some file metadata. You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter for more information. Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to `"data", so if you are relying on this new default behavior then your usage is also affected. Note that none of these vulnerabilities significantly affect the installation of source distributions which are tar archives as source distributions already allow arbitrary code execution during the build process. However when evaluating source distributions it's important to avoid installing source distributions with suspicious links.CVE-2025-4516alpinepython3+281y ago15-05-2025 13:29

There is an issue in CPython when using `bytes.decode("unicode_escape", error="ignore|replace")`. If you are not using the "unicode_escape" encoding or an error handler your usage is not affected. To work-around this issue you may stop using the error= handler and instead wrap the bytes.decode() call in a try-except catching the DecodeError.CVE-2025-4435chainguardpython-3.13+61y ago03-06-2025 12:59

When using a TarFile.errorlevel = 0 and extracting with a filter the documented behavior is that any filtered members would be skipped and not extracted. However the actual behavior of TarFile.errorlevel = 0 in affected versions is that the member would still be extracted and not skipped.CVE-2025-4517alpinepython3+81y ago03-06-2025 12:58

Allows arbitrary filesystem writes outside the extraction directory during extraction with filter="data". You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter for more information. Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to `"data", so if you are relying on this new default behavior then your usage is also affected. Note that none of these vulnerabilities significantly affect the installation of source distributions which are tar archives as source distributions already allow arbitrary code execution during the build process. However when evaluating source distributions it's important to avoid installing source distributions with suspicious links.CVE-2025-4330alpinepython3+81y ago03-06-2025 12:58

Allows the extraction filter to be ignored, allowing symlink targets to point outside the destination directory, and the modification of some file metadata. You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter for more information. Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to `"data", so if you are relying on this new default behavior then your usage is also affected. Note that none of these vulnerabilities significantly affect the installation of source distributions which are tar archives as source distributions already allow arbitrary code execution during the build process. However when evaluating source distributions it's important to avoid installing source distributions with suspicious links.CVE-2025-15367chainguardpython-3.10+469mo ago20-01-2026 21:47

The poplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands containing control characters.CVE-2025-15366alpinepython3+389mo ago20-01-2026 21:40

The imaplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands containing control characters.CVE-2025-15282chainguardpython-3.10+279mo ago20-01-2026 21:35

User-controlled data URLs parsed by urllib.request.DataHandler allow injecting headers through newlines in the data URL mediatype.CVE-2025-6069chainguardpython-3.10+461y ago17-06-2025 13:39

The html.parser.HTMLParser class had worse-case quadratic complexity when processing certain crafted malformed inputs potentially leading to amplified denial-of-service.CVE-2025-6075chainguardpython-3.10+3511mo ago31-10-2025 16:41

If the value passed to os.path.expandvars() is user-controlled a performance degradation is possible when expanding environment variables.CVE-2025-12781chainguardpython-3.10+299mo ago21-01-2026 19:34

When passing data to the b64decode(), standard_b64decode(), and urlsafe_b64decode() functions in the "base64" module the characters "+/" will always be accepted, regardless of the value of "altchars" parameter, typically used to establish an "alternative base64 alphabet" such as the URL safe alphabet. This behavior matches what is recommended in earlier base64 RFCs, but newer RFCs now recommend either dropping characters outside the specified base64 alphabet or raising an error. The old behavior has the possibility of causing data integrity issues. This behavior can only be insecure if your application uses an alternate base64 alphabet (without "+/"). If your application does not use the "altchars" parameter or the urlsafe_b64decode() function, then your application does not use an alternative base64 alphabet. The attached patches DOES NOT make the base64-decode behavior raise an error, as this would be a change in behavior and break existing programs. Instead, the patch deprecates the behavior which will be replaced with the newly recommended behavior in a future version of Python. Users are recommended to mitigate by verifying user-controlled inputs match the base64 alphabet they are expecting or verify that their application would not be affected if the b64decode() functions accepted "+" or "/" outside of altchars.CVE-2025-12084chainguardpython-3.10+6410mo ago03-12-2025 18:55

When building nested elements using xml.dom.minidom methods such as appendChild() that have a dependency on _clear_id_cache() the algorithm is quadratic. Availability can be impacted when building excessively nested documents.CVE-2025-8291chainguardpython-3.10+521y ago07-10-2025 18:10

The 'zipfile' module would not check the validity of the ZIP64 End of Central Directory (EOCD) Locator record offset value would not be used to locate the ZIP64 EOCD record, instead the ZIP64 EOCD record would be assumed to be the previous record in the ZIP archive. This could be abused to create ZIP archives that are handled differently by the 'zipfile' module compared to other ZIP implementations. Remediation maintains this behavior, but checks that the offset specified in the ZIP64 EOCD Locator record matches the expected value.