CGA-4322-JCMW-4GJ4: wazuh-dashboard-dashboards-visualizations Chainguard
CVSS: UnknownUnknown
Published Date unknownLast modified Date unknown
Status not reported
The data service did not report a status for this record. Only the available sections are shown.Vulnerability summary
CGA-4322-JCMW-4GJ4 is a vulnerability in wazuh-dashboard-dashboards-visualizations Chainguard with no CVSS score yet.
CVSS score
Not scored
010
No CVSS score recordedEPSS score
Not scored
0%100%
No EPSS score yetKEVNot listedIn no KEV catalog
RansomwareNone recordedNo known use recorded
Public exploits0No public exploits recorded
Advisory lineage
Upstream 1 · Downstream 0Timeline
No timeline events recorded.
Description
No description has been published for this record.
CVSS metrics
Risk metrics not yet published.
EPSS trend
No EPSS score has been published for this record yet.
Known exploited
Compare KEV catalogsNot in any of the 3 tracked catalogs.
Public exploits
0 foundNo public exploits indexed.
Weaknesses
CWE · root causeNo weakness data has been published for this record.
Affected systems
Chainguard1 product
- wazuh-dashboard-dashboards-visualizations< 4.14.8-r6
1 vendor · 1 product
References
0 linksNo references have been published for this record.
Related vulnerabilities
CVE-2025-64718chainguardairflow-2+2750.42%js-yaml is a JavaScript YAML parser and dumper. In js-yaml before 4.1.1 and 3.14.2, it's possible for an attacker to modify the prototype of the result of a parsed yaml document via prototype pollution (`__proto__`). All users who parse untrusted yaml documents may be impacted. The problem is patched in js-yaml 4.1.1 and 3.14.2. Users can protect against this kind of attack on the server by using `node --disable-proto=delete` or `deno` (in Deno, pollution protection is on by default).CVE-2025-15284chainguardarangodb-3.11+1910.45%Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1.
Summary
The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations.
Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly.
Details
The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).
Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):
if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) {
obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check
}
Working code (lib/parse.js:175):
else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here
obj = [];
obj[index] = leaf;
}
The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.
PoC
const qs = require('qs');
const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 });
console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5)
Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000.
Impact
Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.CVE-2026-2391chainguardarangodb-3.11+1410.54%### Summary
The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).
### Details
When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.
**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).
### PoC
**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**
```
npm install qs
```
```js
const qs = require('qs');
const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };
try {
const result = qs.parse(payload, options);
console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)
} catch (e) {
console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown
}
```
**Configuration:**
- `comma: true`
- `arrayLimit: 5`
- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`
Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error.
Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.
### Impact
Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.CVE-2026-13149chainguardairflow-2+1630.36%brace-expansion through 5.0.6 is vulnerable to denial of service. The expand() function exhibits exponential-time complexity in the number of consecutive non-expanding '{}' brace groups. An attacker who passes a crafted string to expand(), directly or transitively, can cause significant CPU consumption and event-loop blocking. The max option does not mitigate this, as it bounds the output size rather than the recursion work.CVE-2026-84363chainguardcommercial-gitlab-rails-ee-19.1+390.45%Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.13.5, Hono's query helpers treat a question mark after a literal hash fragment as the start of a query string, so the application can read request parameters that browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies, filtering rules, parameter allow and deny lists, access logging, request validation, and other middleware do not observe. The Cache Middleware removes the fragment when building its cache key, allowing a response influenced by parameters inside the fragment to be stored under a key that omits those parameters and later served to other users. This can bypass filtering and auditing, poison cached responses, and enable stored cross-site scripting when an affected parameter is reflected into cached HTML without escaping. Exploitation requires a runtime and intermediary path that passes a literal hash character through to the request URL; Cloudflare Workers and intermediaries that strip fragments are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.5.CVE-2026-84364chainguardcommercial-gitlab-rails-ee-19.1+390.53%Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.13.5, when parseBody() expands dot-separated form field names into nested objects with dot-notation parsing enabled, it does not limit the nesting depth or the total number of intermediate objects created. Empty segments are preserved, so one deeply dotted field name can encode one nesting level per byte, while a large number of shallowly dotted fields can create the same amplification across a request. A request body within a normal size limit can therefore allocate an object graph far larger than the request after the body has already been accepted. An unauthenticated attacker who can reach an affected endpoint can send concurrent requests that exhaust the JavaScript heap, terminate the server process, and leave the service unavailable until restart. Dot-notation parsing is not enabled by default, and applications using the default behavior are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.5.