8.7

CVE-2025-47934: openpgpjs

CVSS: 8.7v4.0HighDeferred
AliasesCGA-9f96-j9h5-mwqrCGA-f298-qch2-gqjgGHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8
Published 19-05-2025Last modified 20-05-2025

Vulnerability summary

CVE-2025-47934 is a high (CVSS 8.7) vulnerability in openpgpjs. EPSS estimates a 0.65% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 49.9% of scored vulnerabilities.

Overall risk
35/100
0100
Medium · default modelHow is this calculated?
CVSS score
8.7/10
010
High · v4.0 (CVE.org)
EPSS score
0.65%
0%100%
Low · 0.00 pp in 30 days
KEVNot listedIn no KEV catalog
RansomwareNone recordedNo known use recorded
Public exploits0No public exploits recorded

Advisory lineage

Upstream 0 · Downstream 0 · Related 1

Timeline

  1. 19-05-2025
    PublishedVulnerability first disclosed.
  2. 20-05-2025
    Last modifiedVulnerability information updated.

Description

OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`. When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.

CVSS metrics

5 scores · 5 sources · 1 version

EPSS trend

Probability

0.65%

Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days

Percentile

50%

Versus all other CVEs

30-day change

0.00 pp

From 0.65% on 19-09-2026

19-09-202619-10-2026
EPSS score
0.65%

Known exploited

Compare KEV catalogs

Not in any of the 3 tracked catalogs.

Public exploits

0 found

No public exploits indexed.

Weaknesses

CWE · root cause

Affected systems

Chainguard2 products
  • kibana-9< 9.0.2-r0
  • renovate< 40.26.1-r0
Npm1 product
  • openpgp≥ 5.0.1, < 5.11.3 | ≥ 6.0.0-alpha.0, < 6.1.1
Openpgpjs1 product
  • openpgpjs≥ 5.0.1, < 5.11.3 | ≥ 6.0.0-alpha.0, < 6.1.1
Wolfi1 product
  • renovate< 40.26.1-r0

4 vendors · 5 products

References

9 links