CVE-2026-33619: PinchTab has Unauthenticated Blind SSRF in Task Scheduler via Unvalidated callbackUrl
Vulnerability summary
CVE-2026-33619 is a medium (CVSS 5.5) Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in pinchtab. EPSS estimates a 0.26% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 17.5% of scored vulnerabilities. 1 public exploit is recorded.
Not severe (CVSS 4.1, network access); no exploitation reported by the 5 checked sources
Source freshness unavailable
How is this decided?Advisory lineage
Upstream 0 · Downstream 2 · Related 2Timeline
- 26-03-2026PublishedVulnerability first disclosed.
- 30-03-2026Last modifiedVulnerability information updated.
Description
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab v0.8.3 contains a server-side request forgery issue in the optional scheduler's webhook delivery path. When a task is submitted to `POST /tasks` with a user-controlled `callbackUrl`, the v0.8.3 scheduler sends an outbound HTTP `POST` to that URL when the task reaches a terminal state. In that release, the webhook path validated only the URL scheme and did not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public destinations. Because the v0.8.3 implementation also used the default HTTP client behavior, redirects were followed and the destination was not pinned to validated IPs. This allowed blind SSRF from the PinchTab server to attacker-chosen HTTP(S) targets reachable from the server. This issue is narrower than a general unauthenticated internet-facing SSRF. The scheduler is optional and off by default, and in token-protected deployments the attacker must already be able to submit tasks using the server's master API token. In PinchTab's intended deployment model, that token represents administrative control rather than a low-privilege role. Tokenless deployments lower the barrier further, but that is a separate insecure configuration state rather than impact created by the webhook bug itself. PinchTab's default deployment model is local-first and user-controlled, with loopback bind and token-based access in the recommended setup. That lowers practical risk in default use, even though it does not remove the underlying webhook issue when the scheduler is enabled and reachable. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by validating callback targets before dispatch, rejecting non-public IP ranges, pinning delivery to validated IPs, disabling redirect following, and validating `callbackUrl` during task submission.
CVSS metrics
3 scores · 3 sources · 1 version- CVE.orgCNA4.1MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:NDiffers
- OSV · GoEcosystem advisory · calculated4.1MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:NDiffers
EPSS trend
Probability
0.26%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days
Percentile
18%
Versus all other CVEs
30-day change
Decrease -0.11 pp
From 0.37% on 04-10-2026
Known exploited
Compare KEV catalogsNot in the CISA KEV catalog.
Not in the ENISA CNW catalog.
Not in the CIRCL catalog.
Public exploits
1 foundPinchtab
Maturity: poc
Weaknesses
CWE · root causeAffected systems
Known conditions: network-reachable, administrative account, no user interaction (CVSS vector). Other conditions: not stated in public data.
Github.com/pinchtab1 product
- pinchtab< 0.8.4
Pinchtab1 product
- pinchtab< 0.8.4
2 vendors · 2 products
References
5 links- github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-xqq2-4j46-vwp7X Refsource CONFIRMWEBAdvisoryExploitMitigationVendor Advisory
- github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/commit/c824574c3a05073dec2f5e9c219e22ffff8de445X Refsource MISCWEBFIXPatch
- github.com/pinchtab/pinchtabPACKAGE