5.5

CVE-2026-33619: PinchTab has Unauthenticated Blind SSRF in Task Scheduler via Unvalidated callbackUrl

Analyzed
AliasesGHSA-xqq2-4j46-vwp7GO-2026-4825
Published 26-03-2026Last modified 30-03-2026

Vulnerability summary

CVE-2026-33619 is a medium (CVSS 5.5) Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in pinchtab. EPSS estimates a 0.26% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 17.5% of scored vulnerabilities. 1 public exploit is recorded.

Priority
Routine

Not severe (CVSS 4.1, network access); no exploitation reported by the 5 checked sources

Source freshness unavailable

How is this decided?
CVSS score
5.5/10
010
Medium · v3.1 (NVD)
EPSS score
0.26%
0%100%
Low · -0.11 pp in 30 days
KEVNot listedNot listed by any tracked catalog.
RansomwareNot flaggedNo ransomware use recorded.
Public exploits1github

Advisory lineage

Upstream 0 · Downstream 2 · Related 2

Timeline

  1. 26-03-2026
    PublishedVulnerability first disclosed.
  2. 30-03-2026
    Last modifiedVulnerability information updated.

Description

PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab v0.8.3 contains a server-side request forgery issue in the optional scheduler's webhook delivery path. When a task is submitted to `POST /tasks` with a user-controlled `callbackUrl`, the v0.8.3 scheduler sends an outbound HTTP `POST` to that URL when the task reaches a terminal state. In that release, the webhook path validated only the URL scheme and did not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public destinations. Because the v0.8.3 implementation also used the default HTTP client behavior, redirects were followed and the destination was not pinned to validated IPs. This allowed blind SSRF from the PinchTab server to attacker-chosen HTTP(S) targets reachable from the server. This issue is narrower than a general unauthenticated internet-facing SSRF. The scheduler is optional and off by default, and in token-protected deployments the attacker must already be able to submit tasks using the server's master API token. In PinchTab's intended deployment model, that token represents administrative control rather than a low-privilege role. Tokenless deployments lower the barrier further, but that is a separate insecure configuration state rather than impact created by the webhook bug itself. PinchTab's default deployment model is local-first and user-controlled, with loopback bind and token-based access in the recommended setup. That lowers practical risk in default use, even though it does not remove the underlying webhook issue when the scheduler is enabled and reachable. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by validating callback targets before dispatch, rejecting non-public IP ranges, pinning delivery to validated IPs, disabling redirect following, and validating `callbackUrl` during task submission.

CVSS metrics

3 scores · 3 sources · 1 version

EPSS trend

Probability

0.26%

Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days

Percentile

18%

Versus all other CVEs

30-day change

Decrease -0.11 pp

From 0.37% on 04-10-2026

04-10-202603-11-2026

Known exploited

Compare KEV catalogs
CISA KEV

Not in the CISA KEV catalog.

ENISA CNW

Not in the ENISA CNW catalog.

CIRCL

Not in the CIRCL catalog.

Public exploits

1 found
  • githubUnverified

    Pinchtab

    Maturity: poc

Weaknesses

CWE · root cause

Affected systems

Version check

Known conditions: network-reachable, administrative account, no user interaction (CVSS vector). Other conditions: not stated in public data.

Github.com/pinchtab1 product
  • pinchtab< 0.8.4
Pinchtab1 product

2 vendors · 2 products

References

5 links