CVE-2026-47065
Vulnerability Summary
Timeline
Description
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.
CVSS Metrics
- v3.1•CRITICAL•Score: 9.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS Trends
Current EPSS score: 0.05%• Percentile: 15%
Techniques & Countermeasures
- CWE-502•Deserialization of Untrusted Data
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
Affected Systems
- apache software foundation•apache mina
≥ 2.2.0, < 2.2.8 | ≥ 2.1.0, < 2.1.13 | ≥ 2.0.0, < 2.0.29