CVE-2026-91085: apache software foundation apache karaf Missing Authorization
Vulnerability summary
CVE-2026-91085 is a medium (CVSS 6.3) Missing Authorization vulnerability in apache software foundation apache karaf. EPSS estimates a 0.37% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 28.9% of scored vulnerabilities.
Timeline
- 29-09-2026PublishedVulnerability first disclosed.
- 01-10-2026Last modifiedVulnerability information updated.
Description
Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.
CVSS metrics
2 scores · 2 sources · 1 version- NVDNIST6.3MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
EPSS trend
Probability
0.37%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days
Percentile
29%
Versus all other CVEs
30-day change
Change unavailable
Change unavailable
Known exploited
Compare KEV catalogsNot in any of the 3 tracked catalogs.
Public exploits
0 foundNo public exploits indexed.
Weaknesses
CWE · root causeAffected systems
Apache1 product
- karaf< 4.4.12
Apache software foundation1 product
- apache karaf< 4.4.12
2 vendors · 2 products