USN-3727-1: bouncycastle Ubuntu

Published

Published 01-08-2018Last modified 27-04-2026

Vulnerability summary

USN-3727-1 is a vulnerability in bouncycastle Ubuntu with no CVSS score yet.

Priority

Insufficient evidence

No CVSS vector published; no exploitation reported by the 5 checked sources

Source freshness unavailable

How is this decided?

CVSS score

Not scored

010

No CVSS score recorded

EPSS scoreNot scoredRisk metrics not yet published.

KEVNot listedNot listed by any tracked catalog.

RansomwareNot flaggedNo ransomware use recorded.

Public exploits0No public exploits recorded

Advisory lineage

Upstream 9 · Downstream 0 · Related 9

CVE-2015-6644 CVE-2015-7940 CVE-2016-1000338 CVE-2016-1000339 CVE-2016-1000341 CVE-2016-1000342+3 more

Timeline

01-08-2018
PublishedVulnerability first disclosed.
27-04-2026
Last modifiedVulnerability information updated.

Description

bouncycastle vulnerabilities It was discovered that Bouncy Castle incorrectly handled certain crypto algorithms. A remote attacker could possibly use these issues to obtain sensitive information, including private keys.

CVSS metrics

Risk metrics not yet published.

EPSS trend

No EPSS score has been published for this record yet.

Known exploited

Compare KEV catalogs

CISA KEV

Not in the CISA KEV catalog.

ENISA CNW

Not in the ENISA CNW catalog.

CIRCL

Not in the CIRCL catalog.

Public exploits

0 found

No public exploits indexed.

Weaknesses

CWE · root cause

No weakness data has been published for this record.

Affected systems

Version check

Known conditions: not stated in public data.

Ubuntu1 product

bouncycastle< 1.49+dfsg-2ubuntu0.1

1 vendor · 1 product

References

10 links

ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-3727-1Advisory
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2015-6644REPORT
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2015-7940REPORT
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2016-1000338REPORT
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2016-1000339REPORT
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2016-1000341REPORT
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2016-1000342REPORT
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2016-1000343REPORT
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2016-1000345REPORT
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2016-1000346REPORT

Related vulnerabilities

PrioritiseCVE-2026-71890legion of the bouncy castle inc. · bc-java +3 more1mo agoMLS external commit can remove an arbitrary group memberIn Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, validation of an MLS (RFC 9420) external commit's proposal list, org.bouncycastle.mls.protocol.Group.validateExternalCachedProposals, counted the proposals by type and bounded the removed leaf index but never established that the removed leaf had anything to do with the joiner. RFC 9420 sec. 12.2 permits at most one Remove proposal in an external commit, with which the joiner removes an old version of themselves, and requires that where one is present the LeafNode in the commit's path field meet the criteria it would have to meet in an Update for the removed leaf, in particular that its credential present identifiers acceptable for the removed participant. The ordinary proposal-list validator's self-remove rule is deliberately not applied on this path, because a resync commit legitimately removes a leaf the joiner owns, but nothing was put in its place. Any party holding the group's public GroupInfo, which is precisely what an external joiner is meant to be given, could therefore commit a Remove naming any member's LeafIndex and have every member apply it, evicting that member and taking over their slot in the ratchet tree. The credential check that should have prevented this existed only in the gRPC interop harness and so protected no other caller of the public Group.externalJoin and Group.handle API. An external commit carrying a Remove is now accepted only when the removed leaf's credential is identical to the one in the joiner's own new leaf, on both the sending and the receiving side.CVSS8.7HighEPSS0.25%RoutineCVE-2026-71891legion of the bouncy castle inc. · bc-java +2 more1mo agoBLS12-381 key validation accepts a public key built on a foreign curveIn Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, BLS12_381BasicScheme.keyValidate, and so BLSPublicKeyParameters and every BasicScheme, MessageAugmentation and ProofOfPossession verify and aggregateVerify that gate on it, accepted a public key built on a foreign ECCurve that merely shares BLS12-381's field characteristic. The prime-order subgroup check trusts a point's own curve to name its cofactor, since ECPoint.satisfiesOrder returns true outright when the curve's cofactor is one, so a point on a curve with a different equation and a cofactor forged to one passed keyValidate despite not being a G1 point at all. In BC's pairing implementation such a point contributes the identity in the target group, so an aggregate signature verified against a set of public keys including it is accepted even though it contains no signature for that key and message pair, admitting a phantom signer. keyValidate now first confirms that the point's curve carries exactly the canonical G1 field, equation, order and cofactor before any subgroup check. The issue is reachable only where an application constructs an ECPoint on an explicit, non-canonical curve and accepts it as an authority-bearing key; the standard 48-byte compressed-point decoder always supplies the canonical curve and was never affected.CVSS7.1HighEPSS0.17%RoutineCVE-2026-18040legion of the bouncy castle inc. · bc-java +3 more1mo agoHQC leaks private key information through secret-indexed GF(2^8) tables and a secret-dependent fixed-weight samplerIn Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, HQC leaked secret-derived data through two side channels: its GF(2^8) arithmetic used lookup tables indexed by field elements, making the cache line touched a function of the operand, and its fixed-weight support sampler left its duplicate scan as soon as a collision was found and stored accepted positions at a secret index. Both run on secret inputs during encapsulation and decapsulation, and the sampler re-expands the secret key from its seed on every decapsulation, so an attacker able to observe cache behaviour or decapsulation timing can recover information about the HQC private key. The field arithmetic is now table-free and the sampler branch-free within a batch of candidates, with output and randomness consumption unchanged.CVSS5.9MediumEPSS0.11%PrioritiseCVE-2026-71885legion of the bouncy castle inc. · bc-java +2 more1mo agoMLS X.509 credential not bound to the LeafNode signature keyIn Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the Messaging Layer Security (MLS, RFC 9420) implementation did not bind an X.509 credential to a LeafNode's signature_key. LeafNode.verify() checked a leaf's signature against the signature_key carried in the leaf itself, while the credential's X.509 certificate chain was stored but never parsed or validated, so the end-entity certificate's public key was never required to match signature_key as RFC 9420 sec. 5.3 requires. A party could therefore present another party's certificate as its credential while signing the leaf, and the enclosing KeyPackage, with an unrelated key, and be accepted under that other party's identity through KeyPackage.verify() and the Group leaf-validation path. In a deployment that admits external commits without an independent credential-admission check, an unauthenticated attacker could be admitted under a victim's X.509 identity, evict the victim (resynchronization compares whole credentials rather than signing keys), derive the current epoch, decrypt subsequent group messages, and send messages accepted as the victim. TreeKEM.LeafNode now requires the end-entity certificate's subject public key, in the cipher suite's signature encoding, to equal signature_key for an X.509 credential and rejects the leaf otherwise, including an empty chain or a certificate whose key type does not match the cipher suite; certificate-chain and identity validation to a trust anchor remain the application's responsibility per RFC 9420 sec. 5.3.1. Deployments using only basic credentials are unaffected.CVSS9.2CriticalEPSS0.20%PrioritiseCVE-2026-71886legion of the bouncy castle inc. · bc-java +3 more1mo agoOpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certification authorityIn Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.CVSS8.2HighEPSS0.17%PrioritiseCVE-2026-71887legion of the bouncy castle inc. · bc-java +3 more1mo agoOpenPGP data signature accepted from a signing subkey without cross-certificationIn Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP API accepted a data signature made by a signing subkey whose Subkey Binding signature carried no embedded Primary Key Binding (cross-certification) signature, in the case where that binding omits a Key Flags subpacket. RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.1.8 and sec. 10.1.3 require the embedded Primary Key Binding signature on any subkey that can issue signatures; it is the subkey's own statement that it belongs to the primary key it is bound under. OpenPGPCertificate resolved the subkey's key flags two different ways. isSigningKey() goes through getKeyFlags() and getApplyingSubpacket(), which falls back to the primary key's direct-key or primary User ID self-signature when the binding signature omits the subpacket, so the subkey inherited the primary's SIGN_DATA and counted as signing-capable; verifyEmbeddedPrimaryKeyBinding(), which enforces the requirement, reads the binding signature's own hashed subpackets, found no SIGN_DATA there, and returned early as a non-signing key without ever demanding the back signature. The same subkey was therefore signing-capable - so its signatures were attributed to the certificate and OpenPGPSignature.OpenPGPDocumentSignature.isValid() returned true - while being exempt from cross-certification, where GnuPG refuses the identical certificate and message. An attacker needs only the victim's public signing subkey, which is public material: they bind it to their own primary key with a Subkey Binding signature they are able to make, carrying no Key Flags and no embedded Primary Key Binding signature, which they cannot make without the subkey's private key, and a relying party verifying one of the victim's genuinely signed messages against that certificate is told the signature is valid and given the attacker's certificate as its issuer. Because a certificate's User IDs are self-asserted, a verifier that pins on the subkey's fingerprint or key ID while taking the identity from the enclosing certificate reports a real signature under an attacker-chosen identity. This is misattribution of a genuine signature rather than forgery of a new one: no private key is recovered, and the signature must be one the grafted subkey actually made. The low-level PGPSignature / PGPPublicKeyRing API performs no binding checks by design and is unaffected. Key Flags are a statement about the key the carrying signature refers to (RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29), so a subkey no longer inherits them from the certificate-wide signatures of the primary key: a Subkey Binding signature that omits the subpacket now leaves the subkey with no capabilities rather than the primary's, which makes the flags the cross-certification check consults the same flags every other decision consults. Preferences and the other subpackets a direct-key signature carries are inherited as before, and the primary key itself, whose flags legitimately come from its own direct-key or User ID self-signature, is unaffected.CVSS8.2HighEPSS0.09%