DEBIAN-CVE-2026-23414

Advisory lineage Upstream: 1 Downstream: 0
Upstream
CVE-2026-23414
Published: 02 Apr 2026, 12:16
Last modified:02 May 2026, 10:04

Vulnerability Summary

Overall Risk (default)
low
22/100
CVSS Score
5.5 MEDIUM
3.1 (osv_debian)
EPSS Score
No data
KEV
Not listed
Ransomware
No reports
Public exploits
None found
Dark Web
Not detected

Timeline

02 Apr 2026, 12:16
Published
Vulnerability first disclosed
02 May 2026, 10:04
Last Modified
Vulnerability information updated

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: Purge async_hold in tls_decrypt_async_wait() The async_hold queue pins encrypted input skbs while the AEAD engine references their scatterlist data. Once tls_decrypt_async_wait() returns, every AEAD operation has completed and the engine no longer references those skbs, so they can be freed unconditionally. A subsequent patch adds batch async decryption to tls_sw_read_sock(), introducing a new call site that must drain pending AEAD operations and release held skbs. Move __skb_queue_purge(&ctx->async_hold) into tls_decrypt_async_wait() so the purge is centralized and every caller -- recvmsg's drain path, the -EBUSY fallback in tls_do_decryption(), and the new read_sock batch path -- releases held skbs on synchronization without each site managing the purge independently. This fixes a leak when tls_strp_msg_hold() fails part-way through, after having added some cloned skbs to the async_hold queue. tls_decrypt_sg() will then call tls_decrypt_async_wait() to process all pending decrypts, and drop back to synchronous mode, but tls_sw_recvmsg() only flushes the async_hold queue when one record has been processed in "fully-async" mode, which may not be the case here. [pabeni@redhat.com: added leak comment]

CVSS Metrics

  • v3.1•MEDIUM•Score: 5.5CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Affected Systems

  • debian•linux

    all | all | all | < 6.1.170-1 | < 6.12.85-1 | < 6.19.11-1

  • debian•linux-6.1

    < 6.1.170-1~deb11u1

References (1)